



Abstract. In this paper many classes of multiobjective games with potential
functions are studied. The notions of generalized, best-reply and Pareto
potential games are introduced in a multicriteria set. Some properties and
Pareto equilibria are investigated
Key words: multiobjective games; Pareto equilibria; generalized potential;
best reply potential; Pareto potential.
1 Introduction
In general potential games in the scalar case have in common an attractive
feature: every maximizer of the potential function, a real valued function
on the set of strategy profile is an equilibrium (NE for short) for the game.
It is natural to ask if the same is valid for multiobjective games, also called
vector games, with the suitable changes, for example by considering Pareto
equilibria instead of Nash equilibria and defining suitable Best-reply.
The problem was partially investigated in [PPT, P]. In this paper we con-
sider other classes of games.
In a potential game, the potential function is similar to a payoff function of
one agent who chooses the strategies for all players.
Rosenthal in 1973 ([R]) introduced the class of congestion games which have
an equilibrium in pure strtegie, if finite ones. Some years late, in 1996, Mon-
derer and Shapley ([MS]), introduced potential games (exact, ordinal and
generalized). They proved that the exact potential games have interesting
relations with the games introduced by Rosenthal and all potential games
have at least an equilibrium in pure strategies: the maximum of a a poten-
tial function corresponds to an equilibrium of the potential game.
In previous papers ([PPT, P]) were studied exact and ordinal potential
games in the multicriteria setting. The goal of studying multicriteria games
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is to have more applications in the real life, infact the decision makers have
not one but several objectives ”to maximize” and often not comparable.
Many other classes of potential games were considered in literature as gen-
eralized, best-reply potential, Nash potential (see [V] and references in this).
We study these classes in a multicriteria setting, we investigate about the
finite improvement property (FIP for short), a cycle of best reply property
and the relations between the equilibria of a potential game and those of
the coordination game (where the payoff functions are equal to the potential
function for each player). The paper is so organized: section 2 is a back-
ground about results, definitions and notations known; section 3 is about
generalized potential games, section 4 is about best-reply potential games,
section 5 is about Pareto potential games and we conclude studying the re-
lations among these. Section 6 concludes with some suggestions for further
research. Many examples illustrate the proven properties.
2 Background
Given a vector x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈
∏n
i=1Xi
we write X−i =
∏
j 6=iXj , x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xn) ∈ X−i and
for all yi ∈ Xi and x−i ∈ X−i (yi, x−i) = (x1, ..., xi−1, yi, xi+1, ..., xn),
(xi, x−i) = x = (x1, ..., xn).
Given x, y ∈ Rn we consider the following inequalities on Rn:
x = y ⇔ xi ≥ yi ∀i = 1, ..., n;
x ≥ y ⇔ x = y and x 6= y;
x > y ⇔ xi > yi ∀i = 1, ..., n.
Analogously we define 5, ≤, <.
We write Rm++ = {x ∈ Rm : xi > 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n} and
Rm+ = {x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n}
We say that U ⊂ Rn is upper bounded (u.b. for short) if there exists b ∈ Rn
such that x ≤ b ∀x ∈ U .
For a function F : V ⊂ Rn → Rm a point x̂ ∈ V is strongly Pareto optimal
(sPE(F) for short) if there is no other feasible point x for which F (x) is
larger than F (x̂) in at least one coordinate and not smaller in all other
coordinates, i.e.
@x ∈ V s.t. F (x) ≥ F (x̂).
A feasible point x̂ ∈ Rm is weakly Pareto-optimal if there is no other feasible
point x such that F (x) is larger than F (x̂) in each coordinate, i.e.
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@x ∈ V s.t. F (x) > F (x̂).
Definition 2.1 A strategic multiobjective game is a tuple
Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉
where N is the set of players, Xi is the strategy space for player i ∈ N , X
is the cartesian product
∏
i∈N Xi of the strategy spaces (Xi)i∈N and each
player has m(i) objectives, i.e. the utility function for player i is a function
ui : X → Rm(i).
In general in vector games each player i can have m(i) different objectives
to “optimize”; the existence of a potential requires that each player has the
same number of objectives: m(i) = m.
In previous papers exact potential games ([PPT]) and ordinal potential one
([P]) in the multicriteria case were studied, so we recall them because there
are some relations with other potential games which we are going to study.
Definition 2.2 The strategic form of an exact potential game is a tuple
Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉, ui : X → Rm and there exist a map P : X → Rm,
such that for all i ∈ N, xi, yi ∈ Xi, x−i ∈ X−i, it holds
ui(xi, x−i)− ui(yi, x−i) = P (xi, x−i)− P (yi, x−i).
Definition 2.3 Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 with ui : X → Rm is called an or-
dinal potential game if there exists a map P : X → Rm such that for all
i ∈ N, xi, yi ∈ Xi, x−i ∈ X−i it holds
uji (xi, x−i) > u
j
i (yi, x−i)⇔ P
j(xi, x−i) > P
j(yi, x−i)
for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Shapley [S] gave a generalization of the classical definition of Nash equili-
brium, the so called Pareto equilibrium (weak and strong Pareto equilib-
rium) for a game. This is a generalization of Nash equilibrium (NE for
short) to a multicriteria setting. We will use these definition for our multi-
criteria games.
Definition 2.4 Given a strategy profile x̂ = (x̂i, x̂−i) ∈ X, it is called
a) a weak Pareto equilibrium for the multiobjective strategic game Γ if for
all i ∈ N @xi ∈ Xi s.t. ui(xi, x̂−i) > ui(x̂i, x̂−i).
b) a strong Pareto equilibrium for the game G if for all i ∈ N
@xi ∈ Xi s.t. ui(xi, x̂−i) ≥ ui(x̂i, x̂−i).
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The set of all strong (weak) Pareto equilibria of G will be denoted by sPE(G)
(wPE(G)). We will write PE(G) when we consider indifferently the strong
or weak Pareto equilibria to our goals. In other words:
given a game Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉, â ∈
∏
i∈N Xi is called
a1) a weak Pareto equilibrium if
∀i ∈ N , âi ∈ wPB(â−i, ui) where we define the weak Pareto best reply (
wPB for short) in the following way:
wPB(â−i, ui) = {ai ∈ Ai : ui(bi, â−i) /∈ ui(ai, â−i + Rm++ and
b1) a strong Pareto equilibrium if
∀i ∈ N , âi ∈ sPB(â−i, ui) where we define the strong Pareto best reply
(sPB for short) in the following way:
sPB(â−i, ui) = {ai ∈ Ai : ui(bi, â−i) /∈ ui(ai, â−i + Rm+
3 Generalized potential games
The notion of generalized potential games in the scalar case has been given
in [MS] and it can be extended to a multiobjective setting.
Definition 3.1 The strategic form of a generalized potential game is a tu-
ple Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉, ui : X → Rm and there exists a function
P : X → Rm such that for all i ∈ N, yi ∈ Y−i, ∀x, z ∈ Yi, it holds
ui(y−i, x)− ui(y−i, z) > 0⇒ P (y−i, x)− P (y−i, z) > 0,
The symbol > have to be intended componentwise.
In the following we will G the set of generalized potential games.
Here an example of a generalized potential bicriteria game:
Example 3.1 Let us consider the following game
G1:
L R
T (0, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0, 2)
B (0, 0) (1, 2) (2, 3) (2, 2)
where wPE(G1) = {(T, L), (B,L), (B,R)}. sPE(G1) = {(B,R)}. A gene-
ralized potential is equal to
P :
L R
T (0, 0) (0, 2)
B (1,−1) (2, 4)




T (0, 0) (0, 2)
B (−1,−2) (2, 3)
We call G the set of all generalized potential game so G1 ∈ G
Note that sPE(P ) = wPE(P ) = {(B,R)} = sPE(P1) = wPE(P1).
Studying ΓP1 and ΓP which are the pure coordination game having the
potential function as utility function for the players, we can note that
wPE(ΓP ) = wPE(Γ) and wPE(ΓP1) ⊂ wPE(Γ). and this is not a case, in
general it holds:
Proposition 3.1 If Γ is a generalized potential finite game the following
relations are valid:
1) wPE(Γ) 6= ∅
2) wPE(P ) ⊆ wPE(Γ)
3) wPE(ΓP ) ⊆ wPE(Γ)
The same relations are valid for sPE.
Proof We prove the result only for the weak Pareto equilibria, the proof of
the strong is similar.
 Let x̂ ∈ wPE(P ) then for all i ∈ N
@xi ∈ Xi s.t. P (xi, x̂−i) > P (x̂i, x̂−i)
and this inequality implies that
@xi ∈ Xi s.t. ui(xi, x̂−i) ≥ ui(x̂i, x̂−i)
so x̂ ∈ sPE(Γ) ⊂ wPE(Γ) so we have proved the inclusion 2) and the rela-
tion in 1) being the games finite.
 let x̂ ∈ wPE(ΓP ) so by definition @xi ∈ Xi s.t. P (xi, x̂−i) > P (x̂i, x̂−i)
and this implies that @xi ∈ Xi s.t. ui(xi, x̂−i) ≥ ui(x̂i, x̂−i)
and so the 3). 
Remark 3.1 In the definition 3.1 of generalized potential game we have to
note that:
a) If uji (y−i, x) − u
j
i (y−i, z) = 0 for some j = 1, ...,m then nothing we can
say about the corresponding relations on P ;
b) If the relations about ui are non confrontable then the corresponding re-
lations about P are not confrontable and in the same sense (because the
intuitive idea is that the strict preferences are preserved going from ui to
P .)
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Theorem 3.1 Let Γ be a game with n players and the strategy sets be inter-
vals in R. Let us suppose that the utility functions are continuously differen-







∀k = 1, ...,m and ∀i = 1, ..., n.
Proof: Starting from the definition of a generalized potential game and fixing
the objective k, dividing the two members with xi − yi and passing to the
limit for xi → yi, we obtain the relations between the first order derivative
of ui and P . 
Definition 3.2 A finite path ` = (x1, ..., xm) in the strategy space X is a
finite sequence of elements xk ∈ X such that ∀k, the strategy combination
xk and xk+1 differs in the i(k)-th coordinate. It is called closed or cycle if
x1 = xm. It is a simple cycle if it is closed and all strategy combinations are
different except the initial and final point. A finite path (x1...xm) is called a
weak improvement cycle if
x1 = xm
ui(k)(xk) ≤ ui(k)(xk+1) for some k ∈ 1, 2, ...,m.
A multiobjective game has the finite improvement property, (FIP for short),
if every improvement path is finite
Proposition 3.2 Let Γ be a finite game. The following properties are equiv-
alent:
a) Γ has the FIP
b) Γ has no strict improvement cycle
c) Γ is a generalized potential game.
Proof The equivalence between a) an b) is obvious in fact if Γ had strict
improvement cycles, then it can be run infinite times against the FIP.
For the equivalence between a) and c), the proof is as in [Mi] adapted to
multicriteria case. 
Remark 3.2 If a game Γ has ordinal potential then it has generalized po-
tential. The converse is not true as the following example proves.




T (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1)
B (0, 1) (0, 1) (2, 2) (1, 0)
An ordinal potential is the following
P :
L R
T (0, 0) (0, 2)
B (0, 4) (1, 3)
and a generalized potential (not ordinal) is for example
P2
L R
T (0, 0) (1, 2)
B (0, 4) (2, 3)
Calling O the set of ordinal potential games, it turns out O ⊂ G, and
G2 ∈ G ∩O.




T (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0)
B (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 0)
A generalized potential is:
P3:
L R
T (0, 0) (−1, 2)
B (0, 0) (0, 0)
G3 ∈ G \O.
Example 3.4 An application: a multicriteria Cournot model.
Let us suppose that there are two companies I and II, which make a duopoly
about a certain product. Both companies decide to advertise their product
through illustrative papers and television spots. The problem is that the
printing of these panels has a bad impact in the environment of the zone
because of the panel-factory is high polluting. It is well known by the two
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companies that if the first invests in advertisement and II does not, then
I increases the value of its products of 5 and decreases the environment
value of 3. In the same time the company I decreases its value products of
5 but that of environment increases of 1. If both the companies invest in
advertisement, the company I will have an advantage of 1 and a loss of 2 in
the environment impact and company II an advantage of 1 for sailing and
a loss of 1 in the environment impact. If both companies do not invest in
advertisement, they obtain 0 for sailing and 0 for pollution. If the company
I invest in advertising and II does not, I will loss 4 for the sailing but it gains
1 for the environment and company II gains 4 for the sailed products but is
losses 1 for the pollution. We can modelize this situation with the following
game:
(X,Y, F1, F2), Fi : X × Y → R2 where X = Y = {P,NP} are the strategy
sets and P is the strategy to invest in advertisement and NP is the strategy
to not invest.
(F1(P,NP ), F2(P,NP ))((3,−3), (−3, 1)),
(F1(P, P ), F2(P, P ))((1,−2), (1,−1)),
(F1(NP,P ), F2(NP,P ))((−1, 1), (3,−1)),
(F1(NP,NP ), F2(NP,NP ))((3, 0), (3, 0)),
The strategic form of the game is:
G4:
P NP
P (1,−2) (1,−1) (3,−3) (−3, 1)
NP (−1, 1) (3,−1) (3, 0) (3, 0)




P (1,−1) (0, 2)
NP (0, 2) (1, 3)
see [FP] to know more about this model in the exact potential case.
4 Best-reply potential games
Definition 4.1 Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 with ui : X → Rm is called a
weak Best-Reply potential game (wBRP game for short) if there exists a
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map P : X → Rm such that for all i ∈ N , ˆa−i ∈ X−i it holds
wPB( ˆa−i, ui) = wPB( ˆa−i, P )
The function P is called weak Pareto Best-Reply potential of G.
In a similar way we can define the strong Pareto potential game.
The relations have meaning componentwise.
Intuitively a game Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 is a Pareto best reply potential
game if there is a a pure coordination game ΓP = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , P 〉 where
the payoff of each player is given by function P such that the best reply
correspondance of each player i in Γ coincides with his (her) best response
correspondence in the game where the payoff functions are the potential one
for both players.
In the following we will write BR for the set of Best-Reply potential games.
Example 4.1 Let us see some examples:
G5:
C D
A (2, 1) (2, 0) (0, 0) (0, 2)
B (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 2)
A Pareto Best-Reply potential is:
P5
C D
A (3, 0) (0, 2)
B (2,−1) (1, 2)
It turns out wPE(G5) = {(A,C); (A,D); (B,D)} = wPE(GP5 ); sPE(G) =
{(A,C); (B,D)}; and analougously for the strong equilibria.
This games is a BR potential game and an ordinal game too, for short we
will write G5 ∈ BR
⋂
O.
An ordinal potential is:
P
C D
A (2; 0) (0; 2)
B (1, 5;−1) (1; 2)





A (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 0) (0, 0)
B (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 0)
C (1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1)
A best reply potential is:
P6
D E
A (2; 2) (0; 0)
B (1, 5; 1, 5) (1; 1)
C (−1;−1) (0; 0)
So G5 ∈ BR \O




A (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0)
B (0, 1) (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 0)
G7 ∈ G \ BR in fact it is a generalized potential game because it has no
strict improvement cycles but it is a Best-Reply one because it ha a best
reply cycle.
The following proposition proves some relations between the equilibria of
the game and of potential function:
Proposition 4.1 If Γ is a best reply potential game and it is finite, the
following relations are valid:
1) wPE(Γ) 6= ∅
2) wPE(P ) ⊆ wPE(Γ)
3) wPE(ΓP ) = wPE(Γ) We can prove the same result for strong Pareto
equilibria.
Proof. The proof is similar to that in Proposition 3.1.
Let us define a best reply cycle to illustrate some interesting properties of
potential games.
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Definition 4.2 A finite path ` = (x1, ..., xm) in the strategy space X is a
finite sequence of elements xk ∈ X such that ∀k, the strategy combination
xk and xk+1 differs in the i(k) − th coordinate. It is called closed or cycle
if x1 = xm. It is a simple cycle if it is closed and all strategy combinations
are different except the initial and final point. A path (x1...xm) is best reply
compatible if the deviating player moves to a best response:
∀k ui(k)(xk+1) = a ∈ PBRui(k)(yi, xk−i(k))
A finite path (x1, x2, ..., xm) is called a best reply cycle if it is a best reply
compatible and x1 = xm and for some k ∈ {1, ...m − 1} and ui(k)(xk) ≤
ui(k)(xk+1)
Intuitively a cycle of weak Pareto best reply (or strong Pareto best reply)
is a cyclic path where in every side the final vertex is the weak (strong
respectively) Pareto best reply of the deviating player to the other’s strategy.
Theorem 4.1 If Γ is a finite and a weak Pareto best reply potential game
then Γ has no weak Pareto best reply cycles.
Proof. Let P be a wBR potential for G and suppose that (x1, ..., xm) is a
wBR compatible. By the best reply compatibility P (xk) < P (xk+1) so it
turns out that there is j such that P j(x1) < .... < P
j(xm) = P
j(x1) and
this is a contradiction so X does not contain best reply cycles.  We note
that the converse is true if on X we define a preorder. The potential games
with a preorder on the strategy space will be an argument of a next paper,
for now see [V] for this topic in the scalar case.
5 Pareto potential games
Definition 5.1 Given a game Γ = 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 with ui : X → Rm,
it is called game with Pareto potential if there is P : X → Rm such that
wPE(Γ) = wPE(ΓP )
and
sPE(Γ) = sPE(ΓP )
Note that all the potential games seen until now, except for generalized
potential ones, are Pareto potential games.




A (1, 3) (1, 3) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2)
B (0, 2) (0, 2) (1, 3) (0, 2) (0, 2) (1, 3)
C (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (1, 3) (1, 3) (0, 2)
wPE(Γ) = sPE(Γ) = {(A,D)}.
A Pareto potential is the following:
P8:
D E F
A (4, 4) (0, 0) (0, 0)
B (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
C (3, 3) (1, 1) (1, 1)
Note that G8 is a Pareto potential game but no other type of potential one.
The following picture shows the studied inclusions among potential multi-
objective games.
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6 Conclusion and open problems
In this paper some classes of potential games have been studied: generalized,
best reply and Pareto potential.
The importance of these games is that they have at least an equilibrium in
pure strategy and it corresponds to a Pareto equilibrium of the potential
function (generalized, best Pareto, Pareto ptential respectively). Further-
more these have interesting application in the real life: network models,
environment problems, telecommunication models. See for application in
the scalar case: [LCS], [MT], [MPT].
We have studied some properties of these classes but much more may be
investigated, for example:
1) The study of approximate equilibria for infinite games (see [Mo], [PPT]
for different concepts of approximate equilibria).
2) The study of the properties of equilibrium with improvement set as intro-
duced in [PT], notion which captures contemporary the idea of exact and
approximate equilibrium. 3) The FIP has relation with Pareto equilibria
and approximate FIP (aFIP for short) could be defined for a multicriteria
setting and we could study the relations with approximate Pareto equilibria.
4) It could be interesting to investigate some well posedeness properties of
the potential game G via the well posedness of the potential function ([MP],
for exact potential games in the scalar case and [Mo] in the multicriteria
setting).
5) Perhaps other classes of potential games can be defined and investigated.
6) Some applications to network models and telecommunication problems
could be investigated via potential games ([LCS], [?]).
7) The potential games could be defined via a preorder on the strategy set
and interesting properties could be found (see [V])
Some of these issues are work in progress.
References
[FP] F.R.Fernandez Garcia and J.Puerto Albandoz ”Teoria de Juegos Mul-
tiobjetivo”, Universidad de Sevilla, (2006).
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